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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine drawing a hot bath in the privacy of your home after a
long, hard day at work. Now imagine that even with the shades
drawn and the doors shut, a government agent across the street
knew the exact moment that you were taking a bath.
Is your home truly private? Most people in the United States
believe that their homes are places of privacy. The Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
individuals the right to be secure from unreasonable government
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1

searches within the sanctity of their homes.
2
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States
3
addressed the question of privacy within a person’s home. With
the advancing technology of government surveillance, law
enforcement now has the capability to locate and measure the use
4
of heat within a home using thermal imagers. Thermal imagers
are devices frequently used by law enforcement to locate high
intensity lights primarily used for the indoor cultivation of
5
marijuana. Unfortunately, however, these thermal imagers do not
distinguish between heat from lights used for illegal activities, such
as marijuana growing, and the heat released from legal activities,
6
such as taking a hot bath in one’s home. In Kyllo, the Supreme
Court decided that the warrantless use of thermal imagers was a
7
search and thus violated the Fourth Amendment.
This note examines the constitutionality of using a thermal
imager without a search warrant. Part II presents the history of
thermal imagers and the Fourth Amendment, how the Fourth
Amendment applies to the use of thermal imagers on private
houses, and how courts have ruled on the constitutionality of
8
thermal imagers in the past. Part III details the facts and decision
9
of the Kyllo case. Part IV analyzes the decision, along with the
ramifications of the decision within the wake of September 11,
2001, and changing public quest for more security, perhaps at the
10
possible cost of personal freedoms. Part V concludes that the
Supreme Court correctly ruled that use of thermal imagers should
constitute a search; however, the Court incorrectly ruled that their
11
decision should encompass all sense-enhancing technology.

1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 28-30.
5. See id.
6. People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231 (1996) (stating that a
thermal imager is indiscriminate in registering sources of heat).
7. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
8. See infra Part II.A-C.
9. See infra Part III.A-B.
10. See infra Part IV.A-C.
11. See infra Part V.
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II. HISTORY
A. Fourth Amendment Protection
“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right
of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
12
unreasonable governmental intrusion.” The people of the United
States expect a certain degree of privacy from government
13
intrusion within their homes.
This expectation of privacy is
primarily protected under the Fourth Amendment of the United
14
States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be
15
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s privacy by
restricting the government’s power of investigation and by
16
prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth
Amendment applies to states through the Due Process Clause set
17
forth in the Fourteenth Amendment.
To comply with the Fourth Amendment when planning to
search an individual’s property, law enforcement must first obtain a
18
search warrant. To obtain a search warrant, law enforcement
must contact a magistrate judge and demonstrate probable cause
12. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)) (describing how the Court has never allowed
federal law enforcement to enter an individual’s home without consent or a
warrant).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967)
(“Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (discussing how the
Fourth Amendment protects against certain kinds of governmental intrusions
(such as searches and seizures), while other Constitutional provisions and state
laws protect against other aspects of an individual’s privacy).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (declaring that no state shall institute a law
that violates a person’s rights set forth in the United States Constitution); see also
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the federal exclusionary rule to
states regarding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
18. FED . R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1).
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that evidence of a crime will be located at a specific place. The
magistrate then may or may not authorize law enforcement to
conduct a search based on the degree of probable cause that law
20
enforcement can demonstrate. Evidence obtained without a
search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule
21
and is barred from use at trial.
Courts originally limited the Fourth Amendment strictly to
22
matters of property. The government had to physically trespass
onto a claimant’s property in order to make a successful claim
23
under the Fourth Amendment. Limiting the Fourth Amendment
to mere searches and seizures of tangible property has now been
rejected, partly due to the ever-increasing technological advances
24
in law enforcement’s investigation and surveillance techniques.
19. Id. See also HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: PROSECUTION
DEFENSE FUNCTIONS §6.4(b) (1993) (“Since the purpose of the search warrant
is to search for and seize evidence instrumentalities, fruits of a crime, or
contraband, the warrant must specifically designate the items to be seized, and the
whereabouts of this material.”).
20. FED . R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1); see also SUBIN ET. AL., supra note 19, at §6.4(b)
(relating how search warrants are most often judged on practical accuracy and not
technical sufficiency); see, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1987)
(holding that a search warrant was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment
when law officers searched two apartments for evidence, one of which was
erroneously included in the warrant, and their conduct and the limits of the
search were based on the information available as the search proceeded).
21. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & DAVID C. BAUM, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 474 (1978). There are a number of exceptions to the
exclusionary rule. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984)
(explaining that under the “good faith exception” evidence will still be in
situations where officers reasonably rely on a search warrant that later is held to be
unsupported by probable cause); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 432 (1984)
(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when the illegally obtained
evidence would have been inevitably or ultimately discovered through lawful
activity); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969) (holding an
exception when the illegally obtained evidence is applied to a suspect whose
Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62, 62 (1954) (holding an exception when the evidence is admitted to
impeach the credibility of the suspect).
22. See e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). Previously, these cases were not held to violate
the Fourth Amendment because property was not trespassed upon. The holding
that the Fourth Amendment cannot be violated unless property is trespassed upon
has been subsequently overturned. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
510-12 (1961) (holding that a trespass upon property is not necessary for a Fourth
Amendment violation, rather it is sufficient that there has been an “actual
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area”).
23. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466; Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134-35.
24. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that the
AND
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With the government’s use of increasingly sensitive and
sophisticated technology, law enforcement can now investigate and
discover personal details about individuals without physically
25
trespassing upon their property. This new type of investigative
technology, sometimes referred to as “sense-enhancing
26
technology,” threatens individuals’ rights to privacy under the
27
Fourth Amendment.
Using sense-enhancing technology, law
enforcement can fly hundreds of feet above suspected offenders’
28
property and see it clearly with high-powered camera equipment.
Using electronic listening devices, law enforcement can listen to a
29
suspect’s conversation without being in the same building. Law
enforcement can even stand outside a suspect’s property and, using
a thermal imager, take thermal images of any heat emitted from
objects within that home, including heat images accurate enough
30
to detect a human heartbeat. As this type of sense-enhancing
investigative technology continues to advance, an individual’s
31
privacy continues to dissipate.
Out of all sense-enhancing technology, the use of thermal

“trespass doctrine” has thoroughly eroded and that the government’s electronic
listening, which did not involve a trespass, was a violation of an individual’s Fourth
Amendment privacy rights).
25. See Jennifer Murphy, Comment, Trash, Thermal Imagers, and the Fourth
Amendment: the New Search and Seizure, 53 SMU L. REV. 1645, 1645-51 (2000)
(discussing types of surveillance technology that are legally permissible).
26. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (discussing technology that
improves human senses and has potential to gather information which could not
otherwise be obtained without physical trespass).
27. A. Michael Froomkin, Symposium, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1461 (2000).
28. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986)
(involving law enforcement’s use of a precision aerial mapping camera placed in
an airplane to take pictures of an area hundreds of feet away); Cal. v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that a picture taken from 1000 feet above
respondent’s yard in an airplane was sufficient evidence to secure a search
warrant).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-55.
30. Jeffrey P. Campisi, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
The Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 46 VILL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2001); Jonathon
Todd Laba, Comment, If You Can’t Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Drug Business:
Thermal Imagers, Emerging Technologies, and the Fourth Amendment, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1437, 1466 (1996). See also United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1509 (10th
Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds by 83 F.3d 1247, 1251-66 (10th Cir. 1996)
(McKay, J., dissenting) (noting that thermal imagers have the ability to recognize
distinct images and that this technology is becoming available to law
enforcement).
31. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1509.
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imagers may pose the greatest risk to the Fourth Amendment.
Instead of people being secure in their homes, the “[u]se of a
thermal imager enables the government to discover that which is
32
shielded from the public by the walls of the home.”
B. What Are Thermal Imagers?
Thermal imagers have been used by the military for quite
33
some time, but are relatively new to law enforcement agencies.
Over the past decade thermal imagers have been increasingly
34
employed by law enforcement.
Closely resembling a video
camera, the thermal imager measures the amount of heat emitted
35
from an object or structure. The imager detects heat emitted
36
from objects and radiated from enclosed structures. The imager
converts the detected heat into a color image. The hotter an
object, the brighter the object will appear in the imager;
37
conversely, the cooler the object, the darker it appears.
32. Murphy, supra note 25, at 1649 (stating that the new surveillance
technology allows the observer to search an individual’s most private belongings
without the need of a search warrant).
33. Thomas D. Colbridge, Thermal Imaging: Much Heat but Little Light, F.B.I. L.
ENFORCEMENT BULL., 18 Dec. 1997, at 19 (stating that the use of thermal imaging is
not new, but only recently employed by law enforcement); Janice Fioravante, Night
Sight, INVESTOR’ S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 26, 1995, at A6 (stating that the military has used
thermal imagers for surveillance, reconnaissance, and navigational assistance since
the 1970’s, and recently this technology is being used by law enforcement);
Kathleen A. Lomas, Note, Bad Physics And Bad Law: A Review of the Constitutionality
Of Thermal Imagery Surveillance After United States v. Elkins, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 799, 800
(2000) (stating that thermal imaging technology has long been available to the
United States military).
34. Campisi, supra note 30, at 241; Scott J. Smith, Note, Thermal Surveillance
and the Extraordinary Device Exception: Re-Defining the Scope of the Katz Analysis, 30 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1071, 1117 (1996) (stating that “[t]hermal imagery has emerged across
the country as the government’s most recent weapon in its war on drugs”).
35. Joy Archer Yeager, Annotation, Permissibility and Sufficiency of Warrantless
Use of Thermal Imager or Forward Looking Infra-Red Radar (F.L.I.R.), 78 A.L.R. 5th 309,
§2(a) (2000) (explaining that all objects with a temperature above absolute zero
emit some radiation; the hotter the object, the more infrared radiation the object
will emit).
36. Id. (stating that most thermal imagers do not actually penetrate the wall
of a structure to measure an object’s radiation level, but instead the imager
measures an object’s radiation level as the heat escapes through that structure to
the outside).
37. Colbridge, supra note 33, at 19 (relating that thermal imagers do not
measure temperature of the object being targeted, but only the relative
temperature of different areas of the object; these differences are then displayed
in various shades of gray, the hotter areas are lighter gray and cooler areas appear
darker).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol29/iss3/9

6

Heydt: The Fourth Amendment Heats Up: The Constitutionality of Thermal I
HEYDT FORMATTED.DOC

2003]

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HEATS UP

2/7/2003 2:39 PM

987

When officers suspect that marijuana is being cultivated in a
house, law enforcement may use a thermal imager to search for
high-intensity heat lamps that are often utilized for marijuana
38
growth. High-intensity lights emit infrared radiation that can be
39
readily detected by imagers when heat is radiating from a house.
After taking heat readings of a structure through a thermal imager,
law enforcement compares how hot that structure is to
40
surrounding structures. In the past, if an extraordinary amount of
heat was radiating from an area of the structure in a pattern
indicating the presence of heat lamps, law enforcement could use
that information to assist in obtaining a search warrant from a
41
magistrate judge.
C. Constitutionality of Thermal Imagers Prior to the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Kyllo v. United States
In the early 1990s, as the use of thermal imagers in police
42
investigation grew, court dockets were being filled with cases
questioning whether using thermal imagers without a search
warrant constituted a search in violation of an individual’s Fourth
43
Amendment rights.
The majority of courts ruled that the
warrantless use of thermal imagers was not a search, but rather an

38. Yeager, supra note 35, at 309.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Mindy G. Wilson, Note, The Prewarrant Use of Thermal Imagery: Has This
Technological Advance in the War Against Drugs Come at the Expense of Fourth
Amendment Protections Against Unreasonable Searches?, 83 KY. L.J. 891, 893 (19941995) (stating that law enforcement uses thermal imaging technology to
“supplement the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant and
contribute to the discovery and eradication of indoor [marijuana] operations”);
Yeager, supra note 35, at §2(a) (stating that other evidence is often used in
combination with the thermal images to establish probable cause for search
warrants). Evidence used in combination with thermal images has included the
odor of marijuana, information from informants, and reports of gunfire form the
suspected premises. United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1989). In
addition, the defendant’s purchase of garden supply equipment, observations of
marijuana stems in the garbage, and boarded up windows have also served as
supplemental evidence in such cases. United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 196-197
(3rd Cir. 1993); Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999)
42. United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 1995)
(“Increasingly, law enforcement personnel are using . . . thermal imaging to detect
indoor marijuana growing operations.”).
43. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that
the warrantless use of thermal imagery has spawned a fair deal of debate).
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44

acceptable police investigative practice. Several other courts,
however, held that the use of thermal imaging was a search that
45
required a search warrant. Regrettably, these courts failed to
come to a consensus and squarely address the constitutionality of
46
thermal imagery.
47
The test set forth in Katz v. United States has been the standard
for determining the constitutionality of the use of new police
48
surveillance technology, including thermal imagers.
Justice
Harlan’s concurrence in Katz set forth a conjunctive two-prong test
to determine whether certain police activities violate the Fourth
49
Amendment. To succeed on an argument that a search was in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, an individual must prove: (1)
a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the challenged search;
50
and (2) that society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.
The Katz test is conjunctive; if either prong is not satisfied, the
police activity in question will not be deemed to be in violation of
51
the Fourth Amendment. In spite of the framework provided by
the Katz test for gauging the constitutionality of thermal imagers,
courts have applied a variety of rationales in ruling that the use of a
thermal imager is or is not a “search” under the Fourth
52
Amendment.

44. Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1041; Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1325; United States v. Myers,
46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994); Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 850; United
States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460 (1994); United States v. Porco, 842 F.
Supp. 1393 (D.Wyo. 1994); United States v. Deaner, 1992 WL 209966 (M.D.Pa.
July 27, 1992); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D.Haw. 1991),
aff’d, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
45. Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1999); State v.
Siedgel, 934 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1997), reversed on other grounds; People v. Deutsch, 44
Cal. App. 4th 1224 (1996); United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir.
1995); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
46. See Lomas, supra note 33, at 800 (stating that the debate over the
constitutionality of the warrantless use of thermal imagery “is a continuing source
of contention within and among the circuits”).
47. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48. Id. See Campisi, supra note 30, at 247; Thomas B. Kearns, Note, Technology
and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy
Concern, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 975, 985 (1999) (explaining the application of
the reasonable expectation of privacy test to recent surveillance technology);
Smith, supra note 34, at 1071.
49. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 360-62.
51. See id.
52. Campisi, supra note 30, at 247.
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1. Ruling That Thermal Imagers Are Not A Search Under the
Fourth Amendment
The majority of courts have ruled that the utilization of
warrantless thermal imaging is not a search under the Fourth
53
Amendment. These courts often employ one, two or all of the
following three arguments in rationalizing why the Katz test is not
54
passed. One argument claims that thermal imaging is a non55
intrusive device, and therefore not a search. Another argument
analogizes the heat waste measured by thermal imagers with the
legal status of cases involving the apprehension of discarded
56
garbage. The third argument analogizes thermal imaging to the
warrantless use of canines trained to sniff-search for drug
57
contraband.
a. Non-Intrusiveness of Thermal Imagery
When law enforcement uses thermal imagers on private
homes, the imagers measure only the heat escaping to the outside
58
of those homes. The Fourth Amendment provides security to
59
individuals from unreasonable searches within their homes.
Therefore, many courts have concluded that thermal imaging scans
are non-intrusive and thus are not searches because the imagers
measure heat escaping outside of the home and the Fourth
Amendment only protects an individual from searches within his or
53. Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d
850, 857 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 668 (7th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson,
24 F.3d 1056, 1056 (8th Cir. 1994); States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 147275 (1994); United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1396-98 (D.Wyo. 1994). See
Lomas, supra note 33, at 809 (noting that the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits, and the Ninth Circuit upon rehearing, have concluded that the
warrantless use of thermal imagery was constitutional); Campisi, supra note 30, at
297 (noting that a majority of courts considering the issue have held warrantless
searches of thermal imagers to be constitutional).
54. Campisi, supra note 30, at 249.
55. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]here was no intrusion whatsoever . . .
because [the heat] rose from [the] house and then was measured by the [thermal
imager].”).
56. Campisi, supra note 30, at 249; see, e.g. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35 (1988). See also Ford, 34 F.3d at 997.
57. Campisi, supra note 30, at 249; see, e.g. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983).
58. Yeager, supra note 35, at 309.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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61

her home. In United States v. Penny-Feeny, the Ninth Circuit held
that because the thermal imager “did no more than gauge and
reflect that amount of heat that emanated from the residence,”
there was no intrusion into the house and therefore the thermal
62
scan did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit similarly held that a thermal scan was not a
search under the Fourth Amendment because the thermal scan
“does not intrude in any way into the privacy and sanctity of a
63
home.” Therefore, under the second prong of the Katz test,
64
society will not recognize this expectation of privacy as reasonable.
Courts have also noted the lack of intimate detail that thermal
imagers actually display in ruling these thermal scans to be non65
66
intrusive and not searches.
In United States v. Robinson, the
60. See Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1329 (holding that there was no intrusion because
the heat rose from the house and then was measured by the thermal imager).
61. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 227-28 (D.Haw. 1991),
aff’d, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
62. Id. at 227-28. See also United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir.
1994). Joseph Pinson’s home was the subject of aerial surveillance by means of a
thermal imager mounted on the undercarriage of a helicopter. Id. This
surveillance was undertaken after he received three packages from companies
known to be suppliers of indoor marijuana-growing equipment and was found to
have been using an inordinate amount of electricity. Id. at 1057. The thermal
scan displayed an excessive amount of heat on the third floor, and a search
warrant was issued. Id. The search revealed marijuana plants, marijuana
equipment, and various books on marijuana cultivation. Id. Pinson argued the
use of the thermal imager without a search warrant violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. Id.
The Eighth Circuit held that Pinson did not demonstrate a subjective
expectation of privacy because the thermal imager did nothing more than gauge
the heat emanating from the house. Id. at 1058. Furthermore, even if Pinson was
capable of demonstrating a subjective expectation of privacy, society was not
willing to recognize such abandoned heat as meeting the definition of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
63. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995).
64. Id. (holding that thermal imaging is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment because it does not pass the second prong of the Katz test).
65. Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that
the district court was not in error when it described the capabilities of the device
as merely displaying a crude image of heat, not depicting any people or activities);
Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330; United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the thermal imaging scan was “of such low resolution as to render it
incapable of revealing the intimacy of detail and activity protected by the Fourth
Amendment”). See also United States v. Depew, 992 F. Supp. 1209, 1209 (D. Mont.
1998) (holding that a thermal imager did not invade the defendant’s expectation
of privacy because the imager did not emit beams or rays into the defendant’s
house, could not detect movement, and did not reveal interior walls).
66. 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995).
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Eleventh Circuit held that society would not deem the use of a
thermal imager as violating an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy because “[n]o revelation of intimate, even definitive,
detail within the house was detectable; there was merely a gross,
nondiscrete bright image indicating the heat emitted from the
67
residence.” Most thermal imagers used by law enforcement can
68
only display hotter and cooler areas of a house. The thermal
scans are usually not accurate enough to display the identity of the
69
object giving off the heat.
b. Analogy to Discarded Garbage
In ruling that an individual lacks a subjective expectation of
70
privacy in the case of thermal scans, several courts have likened
71
heat escaping from a home to discarded garbage. These courts
rationalize that the question of constitutionality regarding
warrantless thermal imager scans should be decided by examining
the past precedence of police rummaging warrantlessly through
72
garbage discarded on the curb.
67. Id. at 1330. The DEA was informed that thirty sodium lights, most
commonly used for marijuana cultivation, were being shipped to the defendant,
Theodore Robinson. Id. at 1327. In addition, utility statements showed that the
defendant was using an inordinate amount of electricity. Id. The DEA conducted
an aerial search with a thermal imager and discovered defendant’s house was
considerably warmer than the surrounding houses. Id. A search warrant was
issued and a marijuana operation was discovered within the house along with a
number of guns. Id. at 1327-28. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence
obtained from his home arguing the warrantless thermal imagery scan was a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id at 1328.
The court found that the defendant did nothing to conceal the heat from
the marijuana lights from escaping from his home. Id. at 1329. Therefore, the
defendant’s inaction did not demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy. See
id. Furthermore, the court held that the thermal imager only displayed crude
images of heat that did not reveal intimate details, and society was not willing to
recognize privacy as objectively reasonable. Id. at 1329-31.
68. Yeager, supra note 35, at § 1.
69. Id.
70. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
71. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35 (1988) (holding that the
warrantless search of discarded garbage is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
72. Pinson, 24 F.3d. at 1058 (likening heat emissions to garbage left on the
curb); Myers, 46 F.3d at 668; Ford, 34 F.3d at 997; LaFollette v. Com. 915 S.W.2d
747 (Ky. 1996) (ruling defendants do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
regarding discarded inculpatory items); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1993) (relying on the analogy of heat emissions to leaving garbage on the
curb, court found privacy was not one society was willing to accept as reasonable).
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73

In California v. Greenwood, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
warrantless search and seizure of discarded garbage left on the
74
curbside of a private home. The Supreme Court observed that
the defendant could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
75
in such discarded items that are so open for public inspection.
“[P]olice cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any
76
member of the public.” The Court held that the warrantless
search and seizure of discarded garbage was not a violation of the
77
Fourth Amendment.
Courts addressing the constitutionally of thermal imaging
point out that thermal imaging scans typically only measure the
78
amount of heat allowed to radiate from a house or structure.
Since individuals do not prevent heat from escaping from their
houses and, in most cases, are trying to vent heat from their houses,
escaping heat is essentially no more than “abandoned heat” or
79
80
“heat waste.” In Ford v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held “[t]he heat that Ford [defendant] intentionally
vented from his mobile home was a waste byproduct of his
marijuana cultivation and is analogous to the inculpatory items that

73. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
74. Id. at 37. A California police officer, suspecting respondent Greenwood
was involved in drug trafficking, had a trash collector pick up Greenwood’s
garbage bags left on the curb in front of his house and give them to the police. Id
at 36. The officer searched the trash bags and found evidence of drug trafficking.
Id. at 37-38. Using prior information along with the information gained from the
trash search, the police officer was able to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 38. While
searching, police found quantities of cocaine and hashish within the house. Id.
Greenwood was arrested on felony narcotic charges. Id.
75. Id. at 41.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Yeager, supra note 35, at §2(a).
79. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1995) (ruling in a
case where defendant purposefully released heat through vents in the roof, that
defendant had no subjective expectation of privacy because he took no steps in
containing his heat emissions); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460,
1475 (1994) (ruling that use of exhaust fans to vent air from marijuana operation
did not exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy because heat vapors were
exposed to public observation); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220,
226 (D.Haw. 1991), aff’d, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993) (defining the by-product
of heat from indoor marijuana cultivation as “abandoned heat” or “heat waste,”
and exposing that heat waste failed to show an expectation of privacy).
80. 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
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81

the respondents in Greenwood discarded in their trash.”
Therefore, many courts have ruled that the use of thermal imagers
without a warrant is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment by
rationalizing, based on Greenwood, that discarding heat is the same
82
as discarding garbage.
c. Analogy to Narcotic Scents Detected by Trained Canines
Several courts have compared heat waste detected by thermal
imagers to scents detected by trained police dogs in holding that
83
the warrantless use of thermal imagers is not a search. Taking
advantage of a canine’s ability to smell, police have trained dogs to
84
85
sniff out and locate narcotic contraband. In United States v. Place,
the United States Supreme Court held that a trained dog’s ability
to smell and locate narcotics was not a search under the Fourth
86
Amendment because it was non-intrusive. The Supreme Court
commented on how unobtrusive the investigative technique of a
“canine sniff” by well-trained narcotics detection dogs is compared
87
to a regular search. Whereas an ordinary search requires an
81. Id. at 997. In 1991, agents of the Florida Police Department, acting upon
suspicion of indoor marijuana cultivation, used a thermal imager on Jerry Ford’s
mobile home. Id. at 992. The scan revealed an inordinate amount of heat
escaping from the home similar to other indoor marijuana operations. Id. A
search warrant was issued based on the thermal imagery scan and other
information and upon searching the mobile home, a sophisticated hydroponic
laboratory and over 400 marijuana plants were found. Id. Ford was arrested for
conspiracy and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Id. Ford moved
to suppress the evidence seized from his mobile home, arguing that the thermal
imagery scan was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, upholding the district court
decision, found that the thermal imagery scan did not violate Ford’s Fourth
Amendment rights. Id. at 997. Ford did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding the heat waste because he did little to prevent the heat from
escaping from his home. See id.
82. United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1995); Ford, 34 F.3d at 997; LaFollette v. Com.
915 S.W.2d at 749 (Ky. 1996); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993).
83. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058 (comparing thermal imaging to canine sniffs); see
also LaFollette, 915 S.W.2d at 750; State v. Niel, 671 So. 2d 1111, 1111-12 (La. Ct.
App. 1996); McKee, 510 N.W.2d at 809; United States v. Deaner, 1992 WL 209966,
at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992).
84. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983).
85. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
86. Id. at 707.
87. Id. The non-intrusive search ensures that the suspect is not subject to
embarrassment and inconvenience associated with ordinary searches. Id.
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officer to open a suspect’s luggage and rummage within, the canine
sniff requires the dog only to sniff the unopened luggage to
88
determine whether there is drug contraband inside.
In thermal imaging cases, courts using the canine sniff analogy
treat a thermal imager’s ability to measure heat as the functional
89
equivalent of a dog’s ability to smell narcotics. In United States v.
90
Pinson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[j]ust as an
odor escapes a compartment or building and is detected by the
sense-enhancing instrument of a canine sniff, so also does heat
91
escape a home and is detected by the . . . [thermal imager].”
Courts have held that thermal scans are non-intrusive like canine
92
sniffs.
Therefore, an individual does not have a subjective
expectation of privacy regarding thermal scans and,
correspondingly, a thermal scan is not a search under the Fourth
93
Amendment.
2. Rulings that Thermal Imagers Are a Search under the
Fourth Amendment
A number of courts have ruled that the warrantless use of
thermal imagers is a search and, therefore, a violation of the
94
Fourth Amendment. These courts also applied the Katz test, but
acknowledged an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy and
95
society’s willingness to recognize that expectation as reasonable.

88. Id. The Court concluded that because the respondent exposed his
luggage in a public place to a trained dog, the “canine sniff” did not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
89. Campisi, supra note 30, at 252-54.
90. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 1058.
92. See cases cited supra note 83.
93. Pinson, 24 F.3d. at 1059. See also LaFollette v. Com. 915 S.W.2d 747, 750
(Ky. 1996); State v. Niel, 671 So.2d 1111, 1112 (La. Ct. App. 1996); State v. McKee,
510 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993); United States v. Deaner, 1992 WL
209966, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 1992).
94. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
thermal imaging was a search); People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231
(1996); State v. Siegel, 934 P.2d 176, 180 (Mont. 1997), reversed on other grounds by
970 P.2d. 556 (Mont. 1998) (noting that thermal imaging is a search under
Montana’s constitution); Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 898 (Pa.
1999) (holding thermal imaging is a search); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 604
(Wash. 1994).
95. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)(stating the two prongs of the test required to pass in order to hold
the police activity in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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Oftentimes, courts that find thermal imaging constitutes a search,
posit their rulings on how the rationales in conflicting rulings were
96
inferior and wrong.
Many courts have ruled that thermal imagers are not passive
non-intrusive devices, but rather are devices actively used to intrude
upon the personal security and sanctity of a home. The
97
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger held
thermal imagers to be devices that are “constitutionally repugnant”
because they “do, in fact, reveal intimate details regarding activities
occurring within the sanctity of the home, the place deserving the
98
utmost protection pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.” It
follows, then, that law enforcement’s ability to distinguish personal
details within the home with the use of thermal imagers violates the
personal security and sanctity afforded to individuals under the
99
Fourth Amendment.
100
In State v. Young, the Washington Supreme Court rejected
the garbage analogy and held that a thermal image scan is a

96. Lomas, supra note 33 at 821 (calling faulty those courts that found no
intrusion); see Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th at 1232 (stating that although most courts
sanction the use of thermal imagers “[a] much smaller body of case law has
rejected that view, and represents the better reasoned authority as applied to
thermal imaging scans of private residences.”).
97. 743 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1999).
98. Id. at 901-02. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a thermal image
scan constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 906. In 1994,
police entered the suspect’s house under a search warrant and discovered twentyone marijuana plants. Id. at 898. Probable cause for the search warrant was based
on information from an informant and information that was collected by a
thermal imager scan, which detected an inordinate amount of heat in the
suspect’s basement. Id. at 898-99. Defendant was arrested and charged with
various violations of Pennsylvania drug laws. Id. at 899. Defendant’s motion to
suppress the evidence seized during the search was denied and, in a bench trial,
he was found guilty of all charges. Id.
The Superior Court reversed the suppression motion, holding that the
warrantless use of the thermal imager was a search and violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. The results of the scanning device to obtain a search warrant
“were invalid and not a proper basis for issuance of the warrant.” Id.
99. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 900 (Pa. 1999); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593,
603 (Wash. 1994) (finding that infrared surveillance [thermal imager] intruded
upon a person’s private affairs). See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S 573, 600 (1980)
(holding the searches and seizures in public places are treated differently than
searches and seizures occurring in the home); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961) (stating the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion stands at the ‘very core’ of the
Fourth Amendment).
100. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
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101

violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Young court noted that
thermal image scans are different from discarded garbage in two
102
important ways.
First, an individual deliberately chooses items
103
they want discarded and sets those items out on the curb. An
individual does not deliberately participate in the venting of heat
104
measured by thermal imagers.
Second, while people can
reasonably foresee an animal or a person rummaging through their
garbage cans, people do not expect the use of sophisticated
105
thermal imagers on their homes. Therefore, an individual has an
expectation of privacy that society will recognize regarding heat
waste because heat loss is inevitable and an individual would not
106
reasonably expect it to be measured.
107
In United States v. Cusumano, the Tenth Circuit found that
the constitutionality of a canine sniff should not be compared to
108
the use of a thermal imager. The court agreed that a thermal
imager, like a canine sniff, does extract internal information in a
109
relatively non-intrusive manner.
However, the intrusiveness of
110
information obtained in both methods is not the same. A canine
101. Id at 601. In 1990, Detective Miller received numerous tips that Robert
Young was running a “big marijuana grow” inside his house. Id. at 595. Detective
Miller conducted a thermal search of Young’s house which indicated there was an
inordinate amount of heat coming from the basement. Id. Based on the previous
information and the thermal scan, Detective Miller obtained a search warrant, and
the search produced a large quantity of marijuana. Id. Young was charged with
intent to manufacture and deliver. Id. Young moved to suppress the evidence, but
the trial court denied the motion and found Young guilty on the stipulated facts.
Id.
The Washington Supreme Court heard the motion on petition and
reversed the trial court. Id. The court found that thermal searches violate an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights because the Fourth Amendment affords
increased protection within a person’s home. Id. at 601.
102. Id. at 601-03.
103. Id. at 603.
104. Id.
105. State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994).
106. See id.
107. 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
108. Id. The Tenth Circuit Panel found that the use of the thermal imager
violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the court, sitting en banc, vacated the
decision and decided the case without reaching the issue of the constitutionality of
thermal imagery. WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.2 (3d ed. 1999) (stating
that the Tenth Circuit’s ruling that thermal imaging was unconstitutional was
“[t]he most exhaustive and compelling analysis of the issue”); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983) (holding warrantless canine sniffs as
constitutional).
109. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1508.
110. See id.
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sniff only reveals the presence of narcotics that an individual is
111
illegally possessing.
A thermal imager, however, is less
discriminate and much more intrusive, revealing all activity that
112
emanates heat. The court held that “because the imager lacks
the precision of the dog sniff, we should not extend Place to allow
113
the warrantless use of thermal imagers upon a home.” The court
further reasoned that an individual has an expectation of privacy
that society will recognize because society will not allow
114
government to intrude into a person’s home without a warrant.
III. THE KYLLO DECISION
A. The Facts
In 1991, Agent William Elliot (Agent Elliot) of the United
States Department of the Interior suspected the claimant, Danny
115
Kyllo (Kyllo), was growing marijuana within his residence.
Without a warrant, Agent Elliot parked across the street from
116
Kyllo’s home and scanned the home with a thermal imager.
Agent Elliot was searching for the inordinate amounts of heat
created from the high-intensity lights used for growing
117
marijuana. The thermal scan showed that the roof and walls of
the garage were emitting a relatively large amount of heat
compared to the rest of the house and other surrounding houses in
118
Three circles, which closely resembled
the neighborhood.
heating lamps used in indoor marijuana cultivation, could be

111. Id. (stating that a dog sniff cannot reveal information about conduct or
activity that an individual has a right to pursue). See Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
112. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1508; People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231
(1996) (“Precisely because the thermal imager is indiscriminate in registering
sources of heat it is an intrusive tool, which tells much about the activities inside
the home which may be quite unrelated to any illicit activity.”).
113. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1508 (10th Cir. 1995). See Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th
at 1231 (arguing that thermal imagers are “the very antithesis of a dog sniff
because the trained narcotics dog alerts only in the presence of contraband”).
114. Cusumano, 67 F.3d. at 1508.
115. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
116. Id. Agent Elliot used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager, which
showed a relatively crude image of the heat radiating out of the Kyllo’s house. Id.
Agent Elliot used the thermal imaging device from a public street scanning both
the front and back of Kyllo’s house. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 30.
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spotted on the roof of the garage through the imager. Based on
these thermal-imaging projections, tips from informants and the
suspect’s utility bills, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant
120
authorizing a search of Kyllo’s home.
Upon searching Kyllo’s
house, police found over 100 illegal marijuana plants growing
121
inside the garage.
122
Kyllo was indicted on federal drug charges.
Kyllo
unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence seized from his home
detected by the thermal imager and then entered a conditional
123
guilty plea. The Ninth Circuit originally held that the thermal
imagery of Kyllo’s home was a violation of his constitutional
124
rights.
However, the government was granted a Petition for a
125
Panel Rehearing, and a full Ninth Circuit Panel heard the case.
The Ninth Circuit, affirming the lower court decision, found
126
Kyllo’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The use of
the thermal imager was not considered a search because Kyllo did
not attempt to conceal the heat escaping and “[n]o intimate details
127
of the home were observed.”
Therefore, the evidence was
128
allowed.
B. Supreme Court’s Analysis
In a five to four decision, with Justice Scalia delivering the
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision
and found that the use of a thermal imaging device on a private
home constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth
129
Amendment.

119. Id. Agent Elliott concluded from his scan that Kyllo was using halide
lights to grow marijuana, which was later found to be correct. Id.
120. Id.
121. Kyllo v. United States, 522 U.S. 27, 30 (2001).
122. Id. Kyllo was in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and indicted for
manufacturing marijuana. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. This opinion was withdrawn and a change of composition took place
within the panel. Id.
125. Id.
126. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31.
127. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that Kyllo had no subjective expectation of
privacy because he did not conceal the heat lost and, even if he had, the thermal
imager did not expose intimate details of Kyllo’s life, only the “hot spots” made
from the marijuana lamps. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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In defining what constitutes a search, the Court used the
130
principle established in Katz v. United States, which held that “[a]
search does not occur . . . unless the individual manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged
search, and society is willing to recognize that expectation as
131
reasonable.” According to the Katz test, the Supreme Court held
that society has recognized an expectation of personal privacy
132
regarding the interior of a private home as reasonable.
Therefore, a search includes the use of any type of sense-enhancing
technology, such as the thermal imager, to investigate information
that could not be otherwise accessible without “physical intrusion
133
into a constitutionally protected area.” The thermal imager used
on Kyllo’s home collected information about the interior of his
home that, prior to sense-enhancing devices, could not be obtained
134
without entering the house. Therefore, the use of the thermal
imager constituted a search and a violation of Kyllo’s Fourth
135
Amendment rights.
The government argued that a thermal imager is not a
“search” because a thermal imager does not penetrate the house,
but merely detects “heat radiating from the external surface of the
136
house.”
The dissenting Justices agreed with the government’s
argument, believing that there should be a distinction between “offthe-wall-surveillance,” which should not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search, versus “through-the-wall-surveillance,” which
137
should be considered a search.
The dissent argued that with
“through-the-wall-surveillance” an observer has direct access to the
information being sought. However, “off-the-wall-surveillance” is a
technique where the observer does not have direct access, but must
make inferences and deductions about what might be happening

130. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
131. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S 207, 211 (1986); accord Katz, 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring).
132. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
133. Id. at 33 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 505 (1961).
However, this definition of “search” is conditioned on whether or not the
technology is readily available for general public use, which this Court determines
thermal imagers are not. Id.
134. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 35 (quoting Brief for the United States Government at 26, Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)).
137. Id. at 35.
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138

within the home.
Since this type of thermal imager does not
directly invade an individual’s home and does not reveal intimate
details of that home, the dissent believed that this was not a search
139
and Kyllo’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.
The majority opinion rejected the distinction between “off-thewall” and “through-the-wall” surveillances, noting that the most
sophisticated thermal imaging devices used “off-the-wall”
140
technology.
The majority further rejected the dissent’s
“extraordinary assertion that anything learned through ‘an inference’
141
cannot be searched.”
With the government’s increasingly
sophisticated use of thermal imagery, few inferences will have to be
142
made by law enforcement. Furthermore, previous case law has
shown that an investigation based on an inference can be an
143
unlawful search.
The government also argued that thermal imaging was
constitutional because it did not detect intimate details taking place
144
within private areas. They based part of their argument on Dow
145
Chemical Co. v. United States,
in which enhanced aerial
146
photographs of the private property of an industrial complex did
147
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
The
Court explained that Dow Chemical dealt with the investigation of an
industrial complex, which does not share the same protection
138. Id. at 41.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 35.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. See http://www.nlectc.org/techproj/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2001) (stating
the goal of the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center is
to possess the ability to see individuals through interior building walls with thermal
imaging technology).
143. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001). The Court acknowledges
that the dissent believes the Court has “misunderstood its point, which is not that
inference insulates a search, but that inference alone is not a search.” Id. at 36.
The Court notes that such a misunderstanding was made to show how this point is
germane to the issue at hand; if an inference is not a search, that has nothing to
do with addressing the question of whether the measurement of heat by the
thermal imager is a search. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984)
(holding that where a police officer “inferred” that a beeper on a can of ether was
in a home, the police search was still considered to be an unlawful search).
144. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38.
145. Dow Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
146. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32-38 (concluding that enhanced aerial photography is a
sense-enhancing technology, however, it is constitutional in this instance because
the information sought after was not the interior of a private home, but the private
property of an industrial site).
147. Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238.
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under the Fourth Amendment as, in this case, the interior of a
148
house.
“[P]hysical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by
149
even a fraction of an inch,’ [is] too much.” Individuals should be
150
protected within the sanctity of their homes. In the home “all
details, are intimate details, because the entire area is safe from
151
prying government eyes.” The government also contended that
152
the Agema Thermovision 210 is a crude thermal imaging device.
The imager did not reveal intimate details of the suspect within the
house; the imager only showed three spots of heat that resembled
153
heat lamps on the roof of the suspect’s house.
The Court
disagreed with the government’s argument, concluding that the
Agema Thermovision 210 could reveal very intimate details of an
154
individual’s life. For example, the thermal imager can detect the
exact time and location where a person is taking a bath because the
155
heat radiating from the water can be detected by the imager.
Regardless of the intimacy of information obtained, “[t]he Fourth
Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to
156
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.”
Therefore, whether a thermal imager detects a suspect taking a hot
bath or turning on closet lights, that information is intimate and
157
should be protected under the Fourth Amendment.
The majority in Kyllo wanted to draw a firm, bright line
158
regarding what constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court wanted to establish what methods of surveillance require
148. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
149. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (affording the right of an individual to be secure
in their home).
151. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. Other cases show all information within the home is
intimate. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 705 (1984) (holding that the
privacy regarding the presence of a can of ether in a home was an intimate detail);
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 321 (1987) (ruling that the registration number of
a phonograph turntable was an intimate detail because it was within the interior of
the home and not in plain sight).
152. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38. The Agema Thermovision 210 is crude in the sense
that other, more sophisticated, thermal imagers on the market have the capability
to detect a human’s location and movements within a structure. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The Court related how the Agema Thermovision 210 could reveal
what hour of each night a lady takes her daily sauna, which would be considered a
very intimate detail of this lady’s life. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 39.
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a warrant and also address future concerns regarding the everincreasing advancements of law enforcement’s investigative
159
technology. “The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the
light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when
it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public
160
interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE KYLLO DECISION
The Supreme Court correctly ruled, in a surprisingly diverse
161
five to four decision, that the use of a thermal imager is a search
that requires a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the
162
United States Constitution.
However, the Supreme Court
overstepped its bounds when it provided an all-encompassing rule
for all sense-enhancing surveillance technology.
A. Violation of the Katz Test and the Fourth Amendment
163

As the main interpreter of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court flexed its interpretive muscles by holding that the warrantless
164
use of thermal imagers is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
165
In examining the Katz test, the Supreme Court took a different
approach than the steadfast rationales used by previous courts that
analogized discarded garbage or dog sniffs to prove the
166
constitutionality of thermal imagers.
The Supreme Court
recognized the increased protection afforded to individuals’ homes
and held that in searches of homes’ interiors “there is a ready
criterion . . . of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and
159. Id.
160. Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
161. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28. There was an unusual ideological division among
the Justices regarding who joined the opinion and who dissented. Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court, which Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
joined. Justice Stevens filed the dissenting opinion, which Rehnquist, O’Connor,
and Kennedy, joined. See David G. Savage, Taking a Page From History: Old English,
Colonial Law Revisited in Pot Scanning, 87 A.B.A. J. 32, 34 (2001) (“If ever there was
an oddcouple lineup among the justices, this was it. Scalia’s opinion was joined by
his fellow history buffs, Justices Souter and Clarence Thomas, as well as by the
more liberal Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.”).
162. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39.
163. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding the basic principle that
the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution).
164. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. at 32-34.
165. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
166. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
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167

that is acknowledged to be reasonable.” This minimal expectation
is premised on common law and the intent behind the Fourth
168
Amendment. The Court correctly ruled that the warrantless use
of thermal imagery by police intruded on an individual’s
expectation of privacy, and to allow this minimum expectation to
be violated would in effect “erode the privacy guaranteed by the
169
Fourth Amendment.”
To arrive at their opinion, the Supreme Court relied primarily
170
on interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court could
have strengthened its opinion by addressing the analogies made in
previous lower court decisions. As previously discussed, lower
courts had repeatedly compared the device to the legal status of
171
discarded garbage and/or of dog sniffs.
The Supreme Court
could have decided on the validity of these comparisons, ruling
presumably that thermal imagery is different from discarded
garbage and dog sniffs.
Before the Supreme Court’s decision, the majority of courts
upheld the argument that lost heat measured by thermal imagers is
analogous to discarded garbage and/or dog sniffs, while the
172
minority of courts dismissed those very same analogies.
The
courts in the minority had a stronger argument and the Supreme
Court could have strengthened its decision by agreeing with them.
The analogy between lost heat and discarded garbage is a weak
173
comparison.
In cases of discarded garbage, items are
174
intentionally placed in garbage receptacles and left on the curb.
One can reasonably expect the garbage to be rummaged through
175
by an animal or person. Heat, on the other hand, is not always
176
intentionally lost.
People do not reasonably expect that their
167. Id.
168. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961) (holding that a man has the right “to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable government searches”).
169. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34.
170. Id. at 32-41.
171. For a discussion of the analogies by the majority of courts who found
thermal imagery not a search, see supra notes 53-92 and corresponding text. For a
discussion of the analogies by the minority courts who found thermal imagery was
a search, see supra notes 93-116 and corresponding text.
172. Campisi, supra note 30, at 247.
173. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash. 1994) (criticizing the analogy
between lost heat and discarded garbage).
174. See id. at 603.
175. Id. at 603.
176. See State v. Siedgel, 934 P.2d 176, 186 (Mont. 1997), reversed on other
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heat is being measured by a sophisticated thermal imager across
177
the street.
Moreover, the analogy of a dog sniff to a thermal imager is also
178
179
a weak analogy. A dog sniff only detects illegal contraband. A
thermal imager scan does not discern between legal and illegal
180
activity. The imager is as likely to display legal activities as it is to
181
display illegal activities within the home.
By addressing the ineptitude of these analogies, the Supreme
Court could have further supported its claim that thermal imaging
182
was a search.
By addressing these analogies, the Court could
have also parried Justice Stevens’ dissent by noting the
ineffectiveness of a rationale comparing lost heat to discarded
183
garbage. Instead, the Court relied on categorizing certain senseenhancing technology as searches if the technology is not available
184
for the “general public use.”
This standard could foreseeably
create a troubling dilemma in the future considering “that the
amount of privacy that is available from the public . . . wanes every
day as we become more technologically advanced and technology
185
becomes more available.”
Therefore, though the Supreme Court correctly ruled that
thermal imaging is a search and in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court should have strengthened its opinion by
dismissing the analogies used by lower courts and the dissent.
B. An Effective Rule for Thermal Imagers, but Not
Other Surveillance Technology
The military is currently using highly sophisticated
surveillance, and it is only a matter of time before this technology is
grounds (stating that, based on the laws of thermodynamics, heat escapes no matter
how much people insulate their houses).
177. See Young, 867 P.2d at 603.
178. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
183. Kyllo, 53 U.S. at 47-50. See Johnathan Ringle, Court Restricts Use of Heat
Sensors, AM. LAW. MEDIA, June 12, 2001, at SF1 (stating that within Justice Stevens’
dissent the Justice made comparisons with cases regarding seized garbage left for
collection with lost heat measured by thermal imagers).
184. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47.
185. Symposium, Modern Studies of Privacy Law Introduction: Keeping Secrets, 86
M INN. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (2002).
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186

also available to law enforcement. In Kyllo, the Supreme Court
constructs a broad rule that attempts to provide guidance for not
only the use of thermal imagers, but for all future sophisticated
187
sense-enhancing surveillance systems. The Kyllo rule states that
“obtaining [1] by sense-enhancing technology [2] any information
regarding the interior of the home [3] that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area . . . [4] at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use” is considered a
188
search.
While the Kyllo rule provides an effective means for
189
dealing with the continued sophistication of thermal imagers, it
fails to provide an effective means to generally account for the
190
advancement of sense-enhancing technology.
The Kyllo rule is effective for thermal imagers because it clearly
addresses the numerous concerns regarding the continuing degree
191
of intrusiveness of thermal imagers within private homes. With
the possible future ability of measuring human heartbeats behind a
wall, the Kyllo rule could prevent the warrantless use of thermal
images as their capabilities continue to advance and threaten
192
privacy. However, as Justice Stevens states within the dissent, “the
category of ‘sense-enhancing technology’ covered by the new rule
193
is far too broad.”
While the Supreme Court correctly ruled that the use of
thermal imagers is a search and violates the Fourth Amendment,
the Court should not have applied this rule to all sense-enhancing
technology. The Kyllo rule could be interpreted broadly enough to
prevent the use of dog sniffs to detect illegal contraband such as
194
narcotics from a home. Applying the elements of the Kyllo rule,

186. Campisi, supra note 30, at 271.
187. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. at 47 (2001).
188. Id. Justice Stevens’ dissent is used to cite the Kyllo rule because it clearly
sets forth the four factors that the rule requires in finding the sense-enhancing
technology is a search under the Fourth Amendment.
189. See id. at 39; see Gibeauit, supra note 162, at 34 (suggesting a new Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence which keeps pace with thermal imagery advancement).
190. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. See id.
192. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995)
(McKay, J., dissenting) (noting that thermal imagers have the ability to recognize
distinct images, and that this technology is becoming available to law
enforcement).
193. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47.
194. See id.
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arguably, dog sniffs could be defined as sense-enhancing
technology that collects information about the inside of the house
195
(odors).
This information could not be attained otherwise
196
without physical intrusion, since trained dogs are not available to
197
the general public. Therefore, the use of trained dogs by police
to sniff out narcotics could be held unconstitutional under the
198
Kyllo test. This rule would overrule United States v. Place and thus
prohibit a very successful and virtually non-intrusive police activity
199
that identifies nothing but illegal activity. Justice Steven’s dissent
even suggests the Kyllo rule could be carried as far as forbidding a
law officer from using an infrared camera to detect a person
200
entering a house with a pizza at night. The use of the infrared
camera would constitute a search because the sense-enhancing
technology could spot a person at night with a pizza that could not
201
be seen during the day.
The officer would know about the
interior of the house by making the inference that someone likes
202
pizza within that house.
Infrared cameras are not readily
available to the public; therefore, this could be considered a search
203
under the Kyllo rule.
Even though this hypothetical may have
over-exaggerated the application of the Kyllo rule, it does raise
important questions about how far Kyllo will be applied in the
204
future. Therefore, the Supreme Court in Kyllo correctly ruled
that the use of thermal imagers constituted a search, however, the
Court applied this rule too broadly when trying to restrict all senseenhancing technology.
C. The Kyllo Rule Relative to the September 11, 2001
Terrorist Attacks
While the decision in Kyllo v. United States was based on illegal
drug production, the rule developed in Kyllo restricting the use of
sense-enhancing technology could be especially poignant in the

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See id.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32.
See id.
See id.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 696 (1983).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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205

wake of recent terrorist attacks. After the World Trade Center
and Pentagon attacks on September 11, 2001, American public
sentiment showed that many were willing to sacrifice their personal
206
freedoms to prevent future terrorist attacks. However, if the allencompassing rule in Kyllo is enforced and thereby restricts law
enforcement agencies’ use of not only thermal imagers but all
sense-enhancing technology, the search for terrorists and the
207
prevention of future terrorist attacks could be hampered.
Details of the infamous September 11, 2001, are well known to
208
all. In a terrorist plot, attributed to the group al-Qaeda, four
American passenger planes were hijacked and crashed into predetermined U.S. targets. Three of the four planes reached their
planned destinations. American Airlines Flight 11 and United
Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the North and South Towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City, while a third plane,
American Airlines Flight 77, slammed into the Pentagon in
209
Washington D.C. A fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, was
diverted from the hijackers’ planned target by the passengers’
205. Peter H. King & Shawn Hubler, America Attacked: After the Violence, a Nation
on Edge, Society: Effects of Last Week’s Terror Will Reach Beyond Heightened Airport
Security to Entertainment, Politics and Much More, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A3
(quoting Jeffrey S. Weiner, former president of the National Assn. of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, “[l]ittle is left of the 4th Amendment . . . [the 4th Amendment]
will certainly be in jeopardy in the light of these horrific events”).
206. See Michael Elliot, America On Guard: A Clear and Present Danger, TIME, Oct.
8, 2001, at 28-29. In a Time/CNN poll, sixty-eight percent of those interviewed
would favor allowing law enforcement to wiretap phones of suspected terrorists
without permission from the courts. Id. Fifty-five percent would favor law
enforcement intercepting e-mail messages without court permission, searching for
suspicious words and phrases. Id. See King & Hubler, supra note 205 (stating that
a Los Angeles Times poll found overwhelming support for random police stops);
Brigid McMenamin, Land Of The Free; We Already Have A Lot of Legal Tools To Fight
Terrorism, FORBES M AGAZINE, Oct. 15, 2001, at 56 (quoting an ABC poll taken after
September 11, 2001 that found “two out of three Americans are willing to
surrender civil liberties to stop terrorism”).
207. Symposium, supra note 185, at 1107 (discussing police power of
surveillance after events like September 11, and how that power may be affected by
Kyllo v. United States).
208. David Firestone & Christopher Drew, A Nation Challenged: The Cases; Al
Qaeda Link Seen in Only a Handful of 1,200 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at
A1. See Liam Braber, Comment, Korematsu’s Ghost: A Post-September 11th Analysis of
Race and National Security, 47 VILL. L. REV. 451, 451 (2002) (describing how the
“[e]vidence soon suggested that Arab Islamic militants [al-Qaeda] backed by
Osama bin Laden, a known anti-American terrorist, had committed the
massacre”).
209. Charles M. Madigan, ‘Our Nation Saw Evil’; Hijacked Jets Destroy World Trade
Center, Hit Pentagon, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 2001, § 1, at 1.
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heroic efforts overpowering the terrorists and forcing the plane to
210
crash in an open field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.
211
Thousands were killed from these horrific attacks and now
Americans harbor a widespread fear that terrorists are apt to attack
again.
The government promptly responded to these concerns in
part by enacting the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA PATRIOT Act”) on October 26, 2001,
212
just six weeks after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Without
delving into the dense and somewhat complex legislation involved
in the USA PATRIOT Act, its purpose was to proactively protect
against possible future terrorist threats within the United States by
expanding the government’s use of wiretapping and electronic
213
surveillance power, clamping down on illegal immigration and
214
215
money laundering, providing swift relief to victims of terrorism,
210. Id.
211. See Margaret Talbot, The Lives They Lived, 3,225 (At Last Count) Died
September 11, 2001, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2001, §6, at 16; see also Michael C.
Bonafede, Note, Here, There, And Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine and
U.S. Uses of Force In Response To Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 155, 215 n.13 (2002) (citing Eric Lipton, Death Toll Is Near 3,000, but Some
Uncertainty Over the Count Remains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at G47 in tallying a
list of those killed, which “excluding the 19 hijackers, consists of 2,801 killed or
still missing from the World Trade Center, 184 killed at the Pentagon and 40
killed on Flight 93, which crashed near Shanksville, Pa.”).
212. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). The Act
consists of ten provisions:
Title I—Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism;
Title II—Enhanced Surveillance Procedures;
Title III—International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist
Financing Act of 2001;
Title IV—Protecting the Border;
Title V—Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism;
Title VI—Providing for Victims of Terrorism, Public Safety Officers, and their
Families;
Title VII—Increased Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection;
Title VIII—Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism;
Title IX—Improved Intelligence; and
Title X—Miscellaneous.
Id.
213. Id. at §§ 201-225. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e) (2000) (allowing an officer,
in the normal course of his duty, to conduct electronic surveillance); 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(i) (2000), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 217(2) (making it lawful for an
officer to intercept a computer trespasser’s wire or electronic communication
involving a protected computer).
214. USA PATRIOT Act, §§ 301-428 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 301-377
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and increasing information-sharing power between investigative
216
agencies. Congress justified the USA PATRIOT Act as necessary
in order to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and
around the world, [and] to enhance law enforcement investigatory
217
tools.”
The Act has provided the government with increased
surveillance and enforcement power to prevent against further
218
terrorist acts.
Many argue, however, that the government’s
increased power to fight terrorism is at the cost of individuals’
219
personal privacy rights.
With the demand for increased surveillance and enforcement
power under the USA PATRIOT Act, sense-enhancing technology
220
could be a valuable tool in helping to thwart terrorist plots.
Through enhanced technology such as electronic wiretaps and
bugs, law enforcement agencies can listen to those with suspected
221
terrorist ties. Rather than narcotics, dogs can be trained to locate
(2001). See Lisa Nelson, Protecting the Common Good: Technology, Objectivity, and
Privacy, PUB. ADMIN. REV., Sept. 1, 2002 (stating that “[u]nder the [USA PATRIOT
Act], financial institutions are required to monitor daily financial transactions
even more closely and to share information with other federal agencies. The
[Act] provides for no judicial review and does not mandate that law enforcement
give the person whose records are being reviewed any notice”).
215. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 611-624 (2001).
216. Id. at § 701. See Ending Terrorism, Investigation, Prosecution Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Ashcroft, Ending Terrorism]
(statement of John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General), available at,
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/agcrisisremarks9_24.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2003)
(setting forth objectives of the USA PATRIOT Act).
217. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
218. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and The Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 913 (2002) (stating that the USA PATRIOT Act “has already
expanded substantially the government’s ability to conduct surveillance on its
citizens”). See Ashcroft, Ending Terrorism, supra note 216 (quoting Attorney
General John Ashcroft that the purpose of the Act was so “[l]aw enforcement
[has] a strengthened and streamlined ability for our intelligence-gathering
abilities to gather the information necessary to disrupt, weaken and eliminate the
infrastructure of terrorist organizations”).
219. See Jonathan Krim, Anti-Terror Push Stirs Fears for Liberties; Rights Groups
Unite to Seek Safeguards, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2001, at A17 (reporting that “[a]
coalition of public interest groups from across the political spectrum has formed
to try to stop Congress and the Bush administration from rushing to enact
counterterrorism measures before considering their effect on Americans’ privacy
and civil rights”).
220. Ted Bridis & Gary Fields, Data Overload: Would the FBI Know What to Do
With Its New Snooping Power?, WALL STREET J., Sept. 26, 2001, at A1 (describing how
the White House is backing away from previous proposals to phase out enhanced
surveillance capabilities in light of the recent bombings).
221. Deborah Barfield, America’s Ordeal: Critics Wary to Bid to Curtail Rights,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 2, 2001 (describing other incidents where wiretapping was used in
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bomb material. Trap and trace devices and pen registers can
be used to capture source and addressee information for computer
225
(e.g., e-mail) and telephone conversations.
Other senseenhancing devices “might detect the odor of deadly bacteria or
226
chemicals for making a[n] . . . explosive.”
It remains to be seen how the Kyllo decision will affect the
227
continued use of these surveillance and enforcement devices. In
an emergency, it is unclear whether law enforcement will be
required to go through the lengthy process of obtaining a search
warrant, as required under Kyllo, to use sense-enhancing
technology when there is a risk of losing a suspect who could be
228
responsible for thousands of deaths. Regardless of the degree of
pursuit of terrorists).
222. See, e.g, Global Training Academy,
http://www.globalcorp.com/trainingacademy (last visited Jan. 23, 2003) (offering
training programs for canines to sniff out drugs, land mines, and bombs).
223. The USA PATRIOT Act amends the definition of a “trap or trace device”
as “a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and
signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or
electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not
include the contents of any communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4), amended by USA
PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 290.
224. The USA PATRIOT Act also amended the definition of a “pen register” as
“a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or
signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such
information shall not include the contents of any communication, but such term
does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or
electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to
billing, for communications services provided by such provider or any device or
process used by a provider or customer or a wire communication service for cost
accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business.” 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(c)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 290.
225. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1), amended by USA PATRIOT Act § 216(b)(1),
115 Stat. 272, 288-89 (expanding the jurisdictional use of trap and trace devices
and pen registers).
226. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47 (2001).
227. McMenamin, supra note 206, at 56 (stating that a target for the antiliberties crowd is the Fourth Amendment which was reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Kyllo v. United States).
228. See Ashcroft, Ending Terrorism, supra note 216 (quoting Attorney General
John Ashcroft that “[l]aw enforcement needs a strengthened and streamlined
ability for our intelligence-gathering abilities to gather the information necessary
to disrupt, weaken and eliminate the infrastructure of terrorist organizations”);
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2141 (2002)
(stating that “Fourth and Fifth Amendment law is likely to move toward greater
authority for the police . . . . The natural conclusion is that we will see a loss of
individual liberty and privacy”).
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intrusiveness of these terrorism-fighting devices, under the overly
broad rule in Kyllo, these devices could be restricted because they
may be classified as sense-enhancing technology generally
unavailable to the public that reveals information within the
229
interior of a house, thereby constituting a search.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, however, the United
States Supreme Court has failed to address the constitutionality of
the USA PATRIOT Act or to apply the Kyllo rule to the
government’s use of sense-enhancing technology for the search of
terrorists. This inaction may reflect a shift throughout the country,
including the courts, of a willingness to sacrifice certain personal
230
freedoms for public safety in fearful times. “With terrorism, our
only defense might be infiltration and surveillance . . . so we’re
231
going to have to choose between security and privacy.” Only the
future will determine which alternative America chooses.
V. CONCLUSION
The Kyllo case presented the United States Supreme Court
with an opportunity to explain why the warrantless use of thermal
imagers on private homes is a search and thus a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court set forth a rule that not
only regulates the current thermal imaging technology but also
provides regulations for thermal imagery as its technology
continues to advance.
The Supreme Court was too broad in applying the Kyllo rule to
not only thermal imagers, but also to other sense-enhancing
technology. The Kyllo rule not only limits inherently intrusive
sense-enhancing technology that should be deemed a search, it also
could restrict successful and virtually non-intrusive sense-enhancing
technology that should not be deemed to constitute a search. After
229. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-5.
230. Carrie L. Groskopf, Notes and Comments, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: The
Supreme Court’s Unnecessary Departure From Precedent in Kyllo v. United States, 52
DE PAUL L. REV 201, 204 (2002) (stating that regardless of the Kyllo decision “the
Court will probably bend over backwards to allow U.S. intelligence to take
whatever measures are necessary in order to ensure that more American lives are
not lost in vain”). See Robin Toner, After the Attacks: Civil Liberties; Some Foresee a
Change in Attitudes on Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at A16 (quoting Senator
Trent Lott stating that, “[w]hen you are at war, civil liberties are treated
differently. We cannot let what happened yesterday happen in the future”).
231. Toner, supra note 230, at A16 (quoting Walter Dellinger who served as
acting solicitor general in the Clinton Administration).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 9
HEYDT FORMATTED.DOC

1012

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

2/7/2003 2:39 PM

[Vol. 29:3

the horrific events of September 11, the Kyllo rule could potentially
hamper using sense-enhancing technology to successfully search
for terrorists. With passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, however, the
courts are seemingly lenient and appear to be willing to tolerate
the use of sense-enhancing technology to prevent another terrorist
attack.
Therefore, the Supreme Court correctly ruled that thermal
imagers should constitute a search.
The Court, however,
incorrectly ruled that their decision should include not only
232
thermal imagers but all sense-enhancing technology. The Court
should attempt to refine its ruling in a way that better protects
individual privacy in the face of rapidly evolving surveillance
233
technology, and rapidly evolving national security needs.

232. See infra Part V.
233. David A. Sullivan, A Bright Line in the Sky? Toward a New Fourth Amendment
Search Standard for Advancing Surveillance Technology, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 991
(2002).
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